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Abstract Farwell in Cogn Neurodyn 6:115–154, (2012)
reviewed all research on brainwave-based detection of
concealed information published in English, including the
author’s laboratory and field research. He hypothesized that
specific methods are sufficient to obtain less than 1 % error
rate and high statistical confidence, and some of them are
necessary. Farwell proposed 20 brain fingerprinting scien-
tific standards embodying these methods. He documented
the fact that all previous research and data are compatible
with these hypotheses and standards. Farwell explained
why failure to meet these standards resulted in decrements
in performance of other, alternative methods. Meijer et al.
criticized Farwell in Cogn Neurodyn 6:115–154, (2012)
and Farwell personally. The authors stated their disagree-
ment with Farwell’s hypotheses, but did not cite any data
that contradict the three hypotheses, nor did they propose
alternative hypotheses or standards. Meijer et al. made
demonstrable misstatements of fact, including false ad
hominem statements about Farwell, and impugned
Farwell’s motives and character. We provide supporting
evidence for Farwell’s three hypotheses, clarify several
issues, correct Meijer et al.’s misstatements of fact, and
propose that the progress of science is best served by
practicing science: designing and conducting research to
test and as necessary modify the proposed hypotheses and
standards that explain the existing data.
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Summary of the science in Farwell (2012): three
hypotheses and 20 scientific standards
Farwell (2012) reviewed all of the available literature
published in English on detection of concealed information
with event-related brain potentials. The most striking fea-
ture of the data is that there is a sharp bimodal distribution
of error rates and statistical confidences. One set of
methods, exemplified by Farwell and Donchin (1991);
Farwell and Smith (2001); Farwell et al. (2012), related
publications, and independent replications, always has
produced less than 1 % error rate and high statistical
confidences. Alternative methods, exemplified by Rosen-
feld et al. (2004, 2008) and Miyake et al. (1993) have
produced over 10 times higher error rates, and statistical
confidences averaging 50 % (chance) for information-
absent (‘‘innocent’’) determinations (Rosenfeld et al.).
Farwell specified the fundamental differences in methods
that have produced these large differences in results as 20
scientific standards, and defined brain fingerprinting as the
technique embodying these specific standards.
Farwell advanced three hypotheses to account for all
data existing to date:
Hypothesis 1 Applying methods that substantially meet
the 20 brain fingerprinting scientific standards provides
sufficient conditions to produce less than 1 % error rate1
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produced 0 % error rate. We characterize this as ‘‘\1 %’’ to provide a
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overall and less than 5 % error rate in every individual
study. This holds true (1a) without countermeasures, (1b)
with countermeasures, and (1c) in field cases where it is
unknown whether countermeasures are being practiced or
not.
Hypothesis 2 Applying scientific methods that substan-
tially meet the 20 scientific standards provides sufficient
conditions to consistently produce statistical confidences
for individual determinations, both information-present and
information-absent, of at least 90 % for information-pres-
ent determinations and 70 % in the opposite direction for
information-absent determinations. (Farwell et al. (2012)
increased this to 95 % for both.)
Hypothesis 3 Some but not all of the 20 scientific stan-
dards are also necessary conditions to simultaneously
obtain the above described levels of (3a) error rate and (3b)
statistical confidence. The standards that are not necessary
are nevertheless useful in that they improve accuracy and/
or statistical confidence.
Meijer et al.’s (2012) discussion of science in Farwell
(2012): Farwell’s three hypotheses and 20 standards
Meijer et al. (2012) stated that Farwell’s hypotheses are not
supported by the literature, but did not cite any relevant
data in support of this position, nor did they propose
alternative hypotheses to explain the existing data.
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Meijer et al. (2012) stated that Hypothesis 1 (which they
phrased in terms of ‘‘accuracy’’)2 ‘‘stands in sharp contrast
with the available literature.’’ They did not cite a single
study, published or not, or even a single anecdotal case, in
support of this statement. Farwell (2012) reviewed all of the
relevant literature, and documented the fact that every case
in every study supports Hypothesis 1: all studies that sub-
stantially met the defining 20 brain fingerprinting scientific
standards achieved less than 1 % error rates, along with high
statistical confidences for individual determinations.
How could Meijer et al.’s (2012) demonstrable and
unequivocal misstatement of fact have arisen? Fundamentally
different, alternative methods that may at first glance appear
similar to brain fingerprinting have produced very different
results. Rosenfeld et al. (2004), a purported replication of
Farwell and Donchin (1991), produced more than 10 times
higher error rates than those specified in Hypothesis 1 and
achieved by Farwell and Donchin—in some conditions no
better than chance accuracy—along with statistical confi-
dences averaging 50 % (chance) for information-absent
(‘‘innocent’’) subjects. So did Rosenfeld et al. (2008) and
other subsequent ‘‘complex trial protocol’’ studies.
Why, then, do Miyake et al. (1993); Rosenfeld et al.
(2004, 2008), and the other similar studies reviewed in
Farwell (2012) not provide evidence against Hypotheses 1
and 2? Because Hypotheses 1 and 2 specify methods that
meet the 20 brain fingerprinting scientific standards. Far-
well explained in detail that Rosenfeld et al. and similar
studies failed to meet even half of the 20 standards.
Rosenfeld et al. (2004) is not anything close to a replication
of Farwell and Donchin (1991). All studies that substan-
tially met the 20 standards achieved the corresponding low
(or in fact 0 %) error rates and high statistical confidences,
as per Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Rosenfeld et al. (2004, 2008) and Miyake et al. (1993)
do, however, provide support for Hypothesis 3: by failing
to meet even half of the 20 standards and producing high
error rates and low statistical confidences, they provide
evidence that at least some of the 20 standards are neces-
sary conditions for less than 1 % error rates and high sta-
tistical confidences.
Meijer et al. (2012) accuse Farwell (2012) of selection
bias and ‘‘selectively dismissing relevant data’’ regarding
Hypothesis 1. In fact, Farwell reviewed every relevant
publication in English to date, and specified in detail the
specific methodological differences that resulted in higher
error rates and lower statistical confidences in the studies
that failed to meet the 20 standards. He did not dismiss or
ignore any relevant data.
Meijer et al. (2012), by contrast, dismissed all of the rel-
evant data—which as Farwell comprehensively showed are
all compatible with the three hypotheses—and did not cite a
single study or case that was incompatible with Farwell’s
hypotheses. Meijer et al. also engaged in selection bias. For
example, they cited Rosenfeld (2005), an article critical of
brain fingerprinting and of Farwell personally that contained
several misstatements of fact. Several of these misstatements
had been previously published and, when the publishers later
checked the facts and realized the statements were false, they
published corrections. Farwell (2011a) published a reply in
the same journal that corrected Rosenfeld’s misstatements of
fact and presented Farwell’s opposing views along with
supporting data, documentation, and references. Meijer et al.
cited only Rosenfeld’s paper, and not Farwell’s.
Meijer et al. (2012) postulate the existence of ‘‘studies
demonstrating that brain fingerprinting is sensitive to
countermeasures,’’ but do not cite any such studies. They
cannot cite any such studies, because no such studies exist.
Nor do they cite any anecdotal evidence, or any supporting
data at all. Farwell discussed every published paper on
2 We use ‘‘error rate’’ rather than ‘‘accuracy,’’ because error rate is
the prevailing legal standard, and error rate has a single unambiguous
definition, while accuracy is defined differently by different authors.
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countermeasures, and described in detail the methodolog-
ical shortcomings in the techniques that were shown to
susceptible to countermeasures and how these techniques
were fundamentally different from brain fingerprinting.
No one has ever beaten a brain fingerprinting test with
countermeasures (or without countermeasures), despite
life-or-death motivation in field cases and a $100,000
reward for doing so (Farwell 2012; Farwell et al. 2012).
The countermeasures that proved effective against Rosen-
feld et al.’s (2004, 2008) methods and other methods had
no effect on brain fingerprinting (Farwell et al. 2012).
As Farwell (2012, p. 150) stated, ‘‘To be meaningful and
practically useful, generalizations about brainwave-based
concealed information tests must distinguish between the
studies that meet the brain fingerprinting standards and those
that fail to meet the standards. Generalizations that fail to
recognize this distinction are inadequate to present a mean-
ingful interpretation of the available data, and can result in
drawing erroneous conclusions about brain fingerprinting that
in fact apply only to non-brain fingerprinting tests that fail to
meet the standards. For example, the low accuracy and
susceptibility to countermeasures characteristic of several non-
brain fingerprinting techniques has sometimes been errone-
ously generalized to apply to brain fingerprinting, whereas in
fact the actual data directly contradict this generalization.’’
Hypothesis 3
Meijer et al. (2012) question Hypothesis 3 based on Farwell
and Donchin (1991). They point out that Farwell and Don-
chin did not meet standards 4, 8, and 10, and nevertheless
achieved the same 0 % error rate as the other brain finger-
printing studies. This does not contradict Hypothesis 3,
which states that some, and not all, of the 20 standards are
necessary. Standards 4, 8, and 10 are not necessary. They are
refinements we developed in response to the challenges of
field applications. Our current working hypothesis is that
standards 4, 8, and 10, although not necessary, do never-
theless improve error rate and/or statistical confidence.
These three standards may explain why the methods of
Farwell and Donchin produced 12.5 % indeterminates,
whereas studies that met all 20 standards have produced 0 %
indeterminates as well as 0 % error rate in all research to
date (e.g., Farwell and Smith 2001; Farwell et al. 2012).
P300 and P300-MERMER
Meijer et al. (2012) question whether the P300-MERMER
has any incremental value beyond the P300 alone. This is a
valid and important scientific question. Seven studies
address this question (see Farwell 2012 for a review). Due
to overriding security concerns, however, publication of
full details of several of our studies at the FBI, the CIA, and
the US Navy has previously not been possible. At the time
of Farwell (2012), only one relevant study, Farwell and
Smith (2001), had been published in full form in a peer-
reviewed journal. The security concerns are now resolved,
we have recently published three peer-reviewed papers,
and several more are under review or in preparation.
Four studies that directly address this question have now
been fully peer-reviewed and published (Farwell et al.
2012). (At the time of Farwell 2012, these studies had been
published only as abstracts.) These four field/real life
studies compared P300 and P300-MERMER in the detec-
tion of concealed information regarding (1) real-life events
including felony crimes; (2) real crimes with substantial
consequences (either a judicial outcome, i.e., evidence
admitted in court, or a $100,000 reward for beating the
test); (3) knowledge unique to FBI agents; and (4)
knowledge unique to explosives (EOD/IED) experts.
All 76 determinations (74 individuals) were correct with
both the P300-MERMER-based analysis and the P300-
based analysis. P300-MERMER provided higher statistical
confidences than P300 in a majority of subjects. This dif-
ference between P300 and P300-MERMER was highly
statistically significant in each of the four studies. The data
to date support the hypothesis that the P300-MERMER has
incremental value beyond the P300 alone. Moreover, Far-
well (2012) reviewed extensive evidence from intra-cranial
recordings demonstrating that the voltage pattern of the
P300-MERMER occurs not only at the scalp but also in
relevant brain structures, which supports the validity of the
P300-MERMER as a neurophysiological phenomenon. In
our view, further research comparing the P300 and P300-
MERMER will be valuable.
The 20 brain fingerprinting scientific standards
Meijer et al. (2012) do not provide any evidence or data
contrary to Farwell’s three hypotheses regarding the 20
standards, nor do they suggest any modifications to the
standards or any alternative standards. Meijer et al. state
‘‘These twenty standards, however, represents (sic) merely
Farwell’s subjective views…’’ Recall what the standards
actually entail, e.g., ‘‘Instruct the subjects to press one
button in response to targets…’’; ‘‘Use a mathematical
classification algorithm…’’ The standards are simply a set
of methods. They are purely objective.
Farwell does express a subjective view, specifically that
to be viable for field use a set of methods must produce
error rates of less than 1 % along with high statistical
confidences. The 20 standards constitute an objective
statement of the methods that, so far, have produced such
results. Meijer et al. (2012) present no evidence contrary to
this fact. Perhaps the word ‘‘methods’’ would have been
more appropriate than ‘‘standards.’’ In any case, Farwell’s
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(or anyone else’s) subjective feelings and opinions about
these methods are beside the point. Their value rests solely
in the results they have consistently produced. Future
research may, of course, demonstrate that refinement or
modification of these methods will minimize error rate and/
or maximize statistical confidence.
Other, non-scientific issues raised by Meijer et al. (2012)
Meijer et al. (2012) state, ‘‘Interestingly, the University of
Illinois patented the original P300 based CIT as published
in Farwell and Donchin (1991). And conveniently, the
‘discovery’ and patenting of the MERMER liberates him
(Farwell) from the constraints of this earlier patent.’’ This
statement, besides being irrelevant to the scientific issues at
hand, is unequivocally and demonstrably false. According
to patent law, a prior patent takes precedence over any
future patent. Everything in the prior patent remained
unaffected by Farwell’s four subsequent US patents. To
obtain additional patents, Farwell had to prove to the sat-
isfaction of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) that his new discovery of the P300-MERMER
was ‘‘novel, useful, and non-obvious’’ over the state of the
prior art, including the University of Illinois patent and the
P300. What ‘‘liberates’’ Farwell from the previous patent
was not his new patents, but rather the fact that the
University of Illinois failed to pay the maintenance fee, so
the USPTO ruled the patent abandoned.
Meijer et al. (2012) appear to advocate an absolute taboo
against mentioning in a scholarly work anything that has
not been previously published in a peer-reviewed journal.
We disagree. Other types of publications are published
because they are perceived to have merit and can provide
relevant and useful data and insights. Patents require proof
that the patented invention is ‘‘novel, useful, and non-
obvious.’’ Book chapters and encyclopedia entries are
scrutinized by knowledgeable editors. Doctoral disserta-
tions pass muster with committees of experts. Conference
abstracts have some measure of scrutiny by editors. In the
context of Farwell (2012), Farwell’s relevant previous
publications include not only six previous peer-reviewed
scientific papers (Farwell 2011a; Farwell and Donchin
1988, 1991; Farwell et al. 1993; Farwell and Smith 2001;
Rapp et al. 1993),3 but also a dissertation (Farwell 1992),
two book chapters (Donchin et al. 1986; Miller et al. 1987);
an encyclopedia entry (Farwell 2013), five patents (Farwell
1994, 1995a, b, 2007, 2010), a legal publication (Farwell
and Makeig 2005), a monograph (Farwell 2011b), and
several conference abstracts (e.g., Farwell, Richardson, and
Richardson 2011). Moreover, since Farwell (2012), Farwell
and colleagues have published four additional relevant
studies (see Farwell, Richardson, and Richardson 2012).
Among the authors of the two papers under discussion
here (Farwell 2012; Meijer et al. 2012), Farwell is not the
only one to include discussion of such sources in his
scholarly writings. Meijer et al. (2012) cite and meaning-
fully discuss Farwell and Donchin (1986), a conference
abstract. In book chapters authored by both Farwell and
Donchin, along with others (Donchin et al. 1986; Miller
et al. 1987) the authors discuss in considerable detail the
methods, results, and relevant data on P300, memory, and
aging published previously in Farwell et al. (1985), a
conference abstract—and not published in full form in a
peer-reviewed journal. Applying an absolute taboo against
discussing such data only to Farwell (2012) and not to the
writings of others—such as the authors of Meijer et al.—
would be discriminatory and inconsistent, and would not
serve the best interests of readers who would like to know
the full story.
Moreover, fortunately, the discussion of the distinction
between conference abstracts and peer-reviewed publica-
tions has become largely moot with the recent peer-reviewed
publication (Farwell et al. 2012) of four studies cited in
Farwell (2012) as conference abstracts, and will become
entirely moot with additional upcoming publications.
Meijer et al.’s (2012) table 1 represents the peer-
reviewed publications and ‘‘verdicts’’4 therein at the time
of Farwell (2012). It does not, however, represent a com-
plete picture of all of the relevant evidence on brain fin-
gerprinting at that time, as discussed above. Moreover,
since that time an additional four studies including 76
subject tests on 74 individuals have been published in a
peer-reviewed journal (Farwell et al. 2012). (These were
previously published as conference abstracts.)
Meijer et al. (2012) accuse Farwell of misrepresenting
conference abstracts as full-fledged peer-reviewed publi-
cations. Consider the following. Farwell (2012) cited Far-
well and Donchin (1986) as follows: ‘‘In the initial brain
fingerprinting research, Farwell and Donchin used the P300
event-related brain potential (Farwell and Donchin
1986….’’ ‘‘Three types of stimuli are presented: probes,
targets, and irrelevants. (Farwell & Donchin 1986…’’
‘‘Farwell and Donchin (1986, 1991) made it clear that brain
fingerprinting detects information, not lies, guilt, or
actions.’’
Meijer et al. cited the same publication as follows: ‘‘The
variant of the CIT with ERPs was first investigated in
3 All six of these, incidentally, meet the recommendations of
Simmons et al. (2011).
4 What they call a ‘‘verdict’’ Farwell has called a ‘‘subject,’’ and
would probably better be called a ‘‘subject test’’ as described below.
‘‘Verdict’’ is a legal term that is inappropriate here, because brain
fingerprinting detects information, not legal culpability.
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the late 80ties [sic] (Farwell and Donchin 1986…’’ In the
reference sections of the respective papers, the citations are
identical word for word. Other citations in both papers are
similar.
Meijer et al. (2012) provide no criterion by which they
judge Farwell’s citations to be ‘‘misrepresenting’’ and their
own to be clearly delineating the difference between con-
ference abstracts and peer-reviewed papers. Our perspective
is that the readers of Cognitive Neurodynamics are highly
intelligent and knowledgeable. We presume them to be
intelligent enough to follow Farwell’s discussion of the
significance of intracranial recordings in the inferior parietal
lobe/supramarginal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, the
amygdala and hippocampus, dorsolateral and orbital frontal
cortices, and the anterior cingulate, and his discussion of the
mathematical distinctions between bootstrapping classifica-
tion and comparison algorithms and the resultant differences
in statistical confidences. Such individuals, in our view, can
find their way to the reference section and readily distin-
guish between different types of publications.
One clarification in terminology is in order. Meijer et al.
(2012) point out a linguistic anomaly that might cause
some confusion, and we would like to take this opportunity
to clarify the situation. Consider the situation wherein John
Smith is tested as a subject on a set of stimuli for which he
is ‘‘information present,’’ and John Smith is also tested on a
different set of stimuli for which he is ‘‘information
absent.’’ How many information-present subjects are tes-
ted? One. How many information-absent subjects are tes-
ted? One. How many total subjects are tested? The answer
‘‘one’’ leads to the anomaly 1 ? 1 = 1. The answer ‘‘two’’
is correct in terms of the number of tests run (and the
statistical power of the design), but it is not quite correct in
that two of the ‘‘subjects’’ were actually the same person.
‘‘Subject tests’’ may be a better term for avoiding ambi-
guity. The statement ‘‘There were two subject tests,’’ along
with a disclosure of the experimental design in which the
same participant was run as a subject in two different tests,
provides a more complete and unambiguous account. The
summary charts in Farwell (2012) (tables 2 and 3) used the
word ‘‘subjects’’ to refer to the number of ‘‘subject tests’’
undertaken, even when one individual participated in more
than one test. Substituting the column heading ‘‘subject
tests’’ would be a useful change that would clear up any
possible ambiguity.
Meijer et al. (2012) use the term ‘‘participants’’ to refer
to individual human beings and ‘‘verdicts’’ to refer to
subject tests. In our view ‘‘verdicts’’ is inappropriate,
because brain fingerprinting does not deliver a legal ver-
dict, but only detects information.5 We prefer the term
‘‘subject tests’’ for reasons described above.6 The term
‘‘participants’’ may also be ambiguous, as it may be con-
strued to refer only to people who participated in a crime or
mock crime, or to all participants in the research.
None of this is an issue for anyone familiar with the
relevant literature, however, because in all of Farwell’s
publications (e.g., Farwell and Donchin 1991), the number
of tests and the number of people who participated have
been clearly delineated, and the authors have clearly dis-
closed when one person is a subject in more than one test.
Moreover, this makes no difference in the statistics com-
puted or the scientific conclusions drawn from the data.
Nevertheless, we are happy to provide a clarification as
above.
Meijer et al. (2012) impugned Farwell’s motives and
character, as follows. As is common in the field, Farwell
and Donchin published their research first as a conference
abstract (Farwell and Donchin 1986) and later as a full
peer-reviewed paper (Farwell and Donchin 1991). Both
Farwell (2012) and Meijer et al. cite and meaningfully
discuss both of the Farwell and Donchin papers. Obviously,
Farwell’s comprehensive tutorial review includes more
detail than Meijer et al.’s brief communication in the dis-
cussion of these and other papers. Farwell includes tables 2
and 3, which present the number of subject tests in the
various studies discussed (see above discussion on termi-
nology). Meijer et al.—and not Farwell—added together
the numbers of subjects in the various studies such that the
numbers were duplicated. That is, when two publications
[an abstract and a subsequent full paper such as Farwell
and Donchin (1986, 1991)] reported on the same research,
Meijer et al. counted the tests twice, thus inflating the totals
for field and laboratory tests. Thus the totals Meijer et al.
computed for laboratory and field studies do not reflect the
actual total numbers of individuals or subject tests in the
studies. Then, on the basis of their own misrepresentative
addition—which does not appear in Farwell (2012)—and/
or on the basis of some difference they postulate but do not
describe in the manner of citing the respective papers (see
above discussion), Meijer et al. accuse Farwell of ‘‘delib-
erately duplicating participants and studies.’’
We will leave it to the readers of Cognitive Neurody-
namics to form their own judgments as to whether either,
both, or neither of Farwell’s (2012) and Meijer et al.’s
5 Farwell and Donchin’s (1991) experiment 1 subjects were ‘‘inno-
cent’’ or ‘‘guilty’’ of a mock crime, but were actually tested on
Footnote 5 continued
information, not guilt. We now use the more accurate terms ‘‘infor-
mation present’’ and ‘‘information absent.’’
6 The term ‘‘cases’’ also refers to tests, and includes field tests that
were not undertaken in the course of a scientific study, and
consequently wherein individuals may not be considered experimen-
tal subjects. Many cases are reported in reports on criminal
investigations, court proceedings, legal publications, etc., rather than
in scientific journals.
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(2012) writings constitute ‘‘duplicating participants and
studies.’’ We choose not to speculate on the motives of our
fellow scientists, so we will not address the question of
whether Meijer et al.’s actions in this regard were ‘‘delib-
erate’’ or not. In any case, in our view, Meijer et al.’s
impugning of Farwell’s motives and character does not
advance the progress of science.
In any case, none of this changes the fundamental sci-
entific issues at hand or the scientific conclusions war-
ranted by the data. The progress of science is driven by
research and data, not by words. Any way you name,
rename, misname, parse, count, recount, miscount, dis-
count, or don’t count the publications, people, and tests, the
fact remains that all available data (including Meijer et al.’s
table 1) are compatible with Hypotheses 1–3 and the 20
scientific standards proposed in Farwell (2012).
Meijer et al. (2012) made a number of other ad hominem
comments about Farwell, his motives, character, subjective
state, intentions, behavior, writing style, etc. In our view,
further discussion of such matters will not serve the pro-
gress of science or the interests of our readers.
Meijer et al. (2012) state that Farwell and colleagues
implemented standard 4 for ‘‘some unexplained reason.’’
Standard 4 specifies using situation-relevant (or crime-
relevant) targets, rather than inherently irrelevant targets
made relevant only by instructions. In fact, Farwell (2012)
explained in detail their reasoning and the considerable
value of situation-relevant targets in reference to the FBI
agent study, devoting 536 words and one figure to this.
Farwell et al. (2012) explained this in even more detail.
Farwell (2012, pp. 118–122) devoted 4,005 words to a
comprehensive discussion of the functional significance,
antecedent conditions, history, neurodynamics, physiologi-
cal mechanism, and signal characteristics P300 and P300-
MERMER. Meijer et al. (2012) quoted one sentence of this
out of context, represented it as Farwell’s view of the P300,
and criticized it as being inadequate. We agree that this
sentence, or virtually any other single sentence from Farwell
or any other publication, is an inadequate description of the
P300.7 We encourage readers to read Farwell’s full article.
Meijer et al. (2012) state that the ‘‘P300-MERMER… is
unlikely to solve the problem caused by the lack of a one-
to-one relationship between P300 and memory.’’ Neither
Farwell nor, to our knowledge, anyone other than Meijer
et al. has suggested that there is (or should be) a one-to-one
relationship between P300 and memory, or considered the
lack of such a relationship to constitute a ‘‘problem’’ to
‘‘solve.’’ Again, we encourage readers to read Farwell’s
(2012) entire article for a comprehensive discussion of the
P300 and P300-MERMER and their role in the detection of
concealed information.
Correction
We have documented misstatements of fact in Meijer et al.
(2012). To be fair, we must acknowledge that there was
also one error in Farwell (2012). Although this made no
difference in the statistics computed or the scientific con-
clusions, we take this opportunity to correct it.
Farwell (2012) documented the fact that the methods of
Rosenfeld et al. (2004, 2008) and subsequent studies
resulted in average statistical confidences no better than
chance (50 %) for information-absent subjects, and that
half of the statistical confidences reported for information-
absent subjects were actually less than chance. That is,
some subjects were (correctly) classified as information
absent (‘‘innocent’’) when according to the statistics com-
puted there was less than 50 % probability that this
determination was correct, and greater than 50 % proba-
bility that the opposite (information present/‘‘guilty’’)
determination was correct. This is in accord with the pre-
dictions of the statistical model applied, and also with the
actual data when reported. This is factually correct infor-
mation provided by Farwell and supported by the relevant
publications cited. A footnote (Farwell p. 147, footnote 4),
however, gave an incorrect example of this from a prior
publication. The corrected footnote, providing a correct
example of this phenomenon, reads as follows:
For example, in Meixner et al. (2009, p. 215),
Table 2, ‘‘innocent’’ subject 11, the subject was
determined to be ‘‘innocent’’ when the computed
probability was 85 % that ‘‘guilty’’ was the correct
determination (i.e., that the probe P300 was larger
than the irrelevant P300, which is the definition of
‘‘guilty’’ in the ‘‘Iall’’ condition). Statistical confi-
dence for this (correct) determination was 15 %, far
less than chance. Six of 10 subjects correctly deter-
mined to be ‘‘innocent’’ in this condition had statis-
tical confidences of less than 50 % (chance) that this
determination was correct.
Let’s focus on the science
In our view, the progress of science is best served by
actually practicing science. With respect to the subject
matter at hand, this means designing and conducting sci-
entific studies to test the three hypotheses and 20 scientific
standards that have up until now proven to be compatible
with all known research results and data.
7 For example, Meijer et al.’s (2012) one-sentence summary (‘‘…the
P300 is elicited by any event that violates the subject’s expectancies’’)
is equally inadequate: it addresses subjective probability, but fails to
address task relevance, an equally important factor.
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Meijer et al. (2012) stated their disagreement with Far-
well’s hypotheses, but provided no data that contradicted
the three hypotheses or the 20 standards. Nor did they
propose alternative hypotheses or standards to explain the
existing data.
These three hypotheses and 20 standards are not, in our
view, the final answer. They are simply the only proposed
explanation that currently fits all the data and accounts for
the existing bimodal distribution in error rates and statis-
tical confidences. Future research and data may of course
require modifications, additions, subtractions, or substitu-
tions in the three hypotheses and 20 standards, or for that
matter their complete replacement with a better explana-
tion of the new data discovered in the future. Our job as
scientists is to practice the relevant science and to conduct
the relevant research.
In our view, we as scientists have a responsibility not
just to satisfy the curiosity of other scientists, but more
importantly to serve the public. For those of us who
practice brain fingerprinting in the field, peoples’ lives and
freedom depend on this science, and on its being practiced
with the most effective methods available.
This is not merely an academic consideration for the
victims of serial killer JB Grinder, or for whoever would
have been his next victim had he not been put in prison
with the help of brain fingerprinting, or for Terry
Harrington, who was in prison for 23 years before brain
fingerprinting was ruled admissible in his case. It is not
merely an academic consideration for the victims of ter-
rorists and serial killers who are still out there getting away
with murder, or for other innocents like Harrington who are
still falsely imprisoned. Human lives and well-being
depend on the progress of this science and its effective
application in the real world.
In our view, scientific progress is best served not by a
war of words (and certainly not by impugning the
motives and character of other scientists) but rather by
conducting new scientific research in the laboratory and
the field; reporting the results thereof; and revising our
hypotheses, theoretical understanding, and methods as
necessary in the light of these new findings. Scientific
progress and human life are also served by applying the
best available scientific methods to address the needs of
people whose lives can benefit from this science. In our
view, focusing on the actual practice of science is the
best and only viable path forward, not only for the sake
of scientific progress, but more importantly for the sake
of all of those whose lives and well-being now and in the
future depend on this science being practiced as effec-
tively as possible.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
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